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Abstract 
 
We use partisan and opportunistic political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations to develop and test a 
framework for explaining election-period changes in credit spreads for developing country sovereign 
bonds.  Pre-election bond spread trends are significantly linked both to the partisan orientation of 
incumbents facing election and to expectations of incumbent victory.  Bond spreads for right-wing (left-
wing) incumbents increase (decrease) as the likelihood of left-wing (right-wing) challenger victory 
increases.  For right-wing incumbent partisan and opportunistic PBC effects bondholder risk perceptions 
are mutually reinforcing. For left-wing incumbents partisan PBC effects dominate bondholder risk 
perceptions compared to opportunistic PBC effects.   
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DEMOCRACY’S SPREAD: 
Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries 
 
Non-Technical Summary 
 
This empirical study investigates the impact of developing country electoral politics on private, 
often foreign-based financial actors making decisions about risks associated with developing country 
lending and investment.  It is a companion piece to another recent William Davidson Institute working 
paper entitled:  “Democratization’s Risk Premium:  Partisan and Opportunistic Political Business Cycle 
Effects on Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries” (WDI Working Paper #456). 
 
Since the 1970s, political business cycle (“PBC”) theory has been debated among academic 
researchers largely in the context of industrialized democracies and almost exclusively in the context of 
interactions among domestic political stakeholders, such as between elected incumbents and voters.  
Early, so-called “opportunistic” PBC models posited opportunistic politicians using expansionary fiscal, 
monetary and related policies during elections to boost their chances of retaining office, even if such 
policies have detrimental economic consequences in the post-election period.  Later, so-called “partisan” 
PBC models also assumed that candidates championed economic policies for electoral purposes; 
however, their policies differed markedly with right-wing candidates characteristically emphasizing lower 
inflation, and left-wing candidates preferring lower unemployment.  Empirical researchers using PBC 
models have generally chosen either the opportunistic or the partisan branches, even though both may be 
relevant to explaining the behavior of individuals, firms and governments during election periods. 
 
This study differs in many ways from this previous stream of research.  First, we focus on the 
impact of PBC-related factors on private, foreign based financial actors rather than on domestic elected 
officials and voters.  Second, we focus on developing countries where PBC-related factors are less studied 
rather than on industrialized countries.  Finally, we examine the PBC-related behaviors of private, 
foreign-based financial actors using both opportunistic and partisan PBC model assumptions, rather than 
choose one or the branch of models. In “Democratization’s Premium,” we examined these PBC behaviors 
in the context of major credit rating agencies and their election-period assessments of sovereign risk in 
developing countries.  In this study, we examine such PBC behaviors in the context of individual and 
institutional investors holding developing country sovereign bonds (“bondholders”).  
 
Sovereign bonds and bondholders are playing an increasingly important role in developing 
country finance, investment and economic growth. The origins of the developing country sovereign bond 
market were in the debt crisis of the early 1980s.  So-called “Brady bonds” arose to securitize that debt, to 
create secondary markets for it, and to lower the overall cost of borrowing to sovereigns and sub-
sovereign individuals by reducing investor liquidity (though not basic default) risks.  In addition to Brady 
bonds, developing country sovereign and sub-sovereign individuals in the 1990s issued new debt 
securities, primarily on European markets, often with face amounts in $ billions.  By 2000, annual trading 
volume in Brady and non-Brady Eurobonds issued by developing country sovereigns and sub-sovereigns 
topped $1.6 trillion or approximately $4.3 billion in daily trades.  Broker-dealers, investment banks, 
governments, insurance companies, pension, hedge and mutual funds, and wealthy individuals comprise 
this trading secondary market of bondholders linked electronically and capable of quickly connecting 
buyers and sellers, executing and clearing their trades in “round lots” of at least $2 million. 
   
Our study proposes that private, often foreign-based financial actors including these bondholders, 
care about PBC-related considerations, and “vote” on the sovereign creditworthiness of developing 
countries during election periods based on such considerations.  To the extent that an incumbent’s pre-
election spending sprees or the likely electoral victor’s partisan economic policy choices are perceived by 
agencies to undermine sovereign financial commitments, election-period assessments of creditworthiness   3
could become markedly less favorable.  For bondholders, a less favorable assessment of a developing 
country’s sovereign creditworthiness means an increase in the yields they will require to hold that same 
developing country’s sovereign bonds.  As developing country sovereign creditworthiness decreases, the 
“spread” between yields on its sovereign bonds compared to US Treasury bonds of comparable maturity 
will increase.  We measure this spread in relative terms : (YieldForeign–YieldU.S.)/YieldU.S..  Increasing 
spreads indicate decreasing sovereign creditworthiness from a bondholder perspective; decreasing spreads 
indicate increasing sovereign creditworthiness.   
 
We develop a conceptual framework for understanding how bondholder decisions about 
sovereign creditworthiness may be shaped by partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations.  We then 
derive and test several hypotheses from the framework, which is illustrated below: 
 
Predicted Directions of Pre-Election Changes in Relative Bond Spreads Based on Partisan and 
Opportunistic PBC Considerations 
 
Incumbent Partisan Orientation → 
Bondholder Electoral Expectation ↓ 
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  Predicted direction of change in spread based PBC considerations:  (Partisan, Opportunistic) 
   
Think of an investor holding a sovereign bond from a developing country in the final stages of a 
presidential election campaign pitting right-wing versus left-wing candidates.  Given the partisan 
orientation of the incumbent facing election (right-wing or left-wing), and given the expectations of 
his/her re-election on that day prior to the final poll, we can predict the direction of any change in spreads 
the bondholder might demand using opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations.  We assume that 
right-wing incumbent policy preferences favor creditor interests (and thus induce better bondholder 
assessments of sovereign credit risk).   
 
Against this backdrop we have two “base case” scenarios.  In the right-wing base case, a right-
wing incumbent faces re-election and is expected to win.  In that case, there is likely to be no change in 
trends sovereign bond spreads already exhibit over time (0,0):  From a partisan PBC perspective, current 
right-wing policies favorable to creditors are likely to continue after the election; from an opportunistic 
PBC perspective, the expectation of right-wing electoral victory puts little pressure on the incumbent to 
engage in pre-election spending sprees meant to buy votes, again assuaging the credit concerns of 
bondholders.  The left-wing base involves a similar logic (0,0):  If a left-wing incumbent is expected to 
win easily, both partisan and opportunistic considerations indicate no change in trends for bond spreads. 
   4
Interestingly, though, the predicted pre-election trend in bond spreads differs from these base 
cases for countries with right- and left-wing incumbents once electoral expectations become mixed or it 
becomes clear that the challenger to the incumbent is likely to win.  For instance, with a right-wing 
incumbent, uncertainty regarding the eventual electoral outcome –what we call “mixed expectations”— 
or likely ouster by a left-wing candidate acts like a double negative increasing pre-election spreads 
relative to the right-wing base case (+,+):  From a partisan PBC perspective, the prospect of possible or 
likely partisan shift unfavorable to creditors will prompt an increase in pre-election spreads; from an 
opportunistic PBC perspective the possibility (mixed expectations) or expectation of left-wing victory is 
likely to prompt the right-wing incumbent to engage in a spending spree meant to buy votes and stave off 
electoral defeat, a prospect that also increases pre-election spreads.  With left-wing incumbents, the 
predicted effects of partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations is not mutually reinforcing as in right-
wing incumbent cases, but mutually counteracting.  When expectations of left-wing incumbent victory are 
unclear (mixed expectations) or if ouster by a right-wing challenger is likely then the PBC effects on pre-
election bond spreads are both negative and positive (-,+):  From a partisan PBC perspective, the 
possibility or great likelihood of a partisan switch to creditor-friendly right-wing policies will negatively 
affect spreads; from an opportunistic PBC perspective, however, the possibility or great likelihood of 
losing out to the right-wing challenger will prompt the left-wing incumbent to engage in a spending spree 
to buy votes, a prospect that will positively affect spreads. 
 
To test these predictions drawn from partisan and opportunistic PBC models, we collected data 
spreads observed in the last 90 days prior to 19 presidential elections occurring in 12 developing countries 
between 1994 and 2000.  We analyzed these data in a robust general estimation equation that also 
included a range of control variables found in previous research to explain pre-election trends in spreads.  
Our analyses revealed substantial evidence consistent with our framework for right-wing incumbents.  We 
found significant positive effects on sovereign bond spreads compared to the right-wing base case when 
right-wing incumbents faced left-wing challengers likely to defeat them, or at least, likely to make it a 
“close call” for the right-wing incumbent on election day.  Interestingly, we found the same hierarchy in 
bond spreads for developing country elections with left-wing incumbents.  As the likelihood of left-wing 
incumbent re-election fell from likely to a “close call” to unlikely, bond spreads also fell.  We take this as 
indication that partisan PBC considerations dominate over opportunistic concerns for bondholders 
observing developing country elections with left-wing incumbents.   
 
These results and others suggest to us that agencies behave consistently with partisan and 
opportunistic PBC considerations, and, in certain instances exact a risk “surcharge” on the cost of 
developing country sovereign debt based on these considerations.  The changes in bond spreads we 
observed may, at first glance, seem small.  For example, the Polish presidential elections on October 8, 
2000 saw the left-wing government of Aleksander Kwasniewski being re-elected to office by a large 
margin.  Our analyses predict an increase in spreads on Polish sovereign bonds of roughly 38 basis points 
(.38%) over the last 90 days prior to election. The actual increase in the yield on the Polish series FRB 
sovereign bond used in our sample in the 90-day pre-election period was 30 basis points.  With Polish 
outstanding foreign debt of approximately $63 billion at the end of 2000, the implied increase in the cost 
of funding such debt (30 basis points) is approximately $189 million annually.  Small differences in the 
likelihood of re-election as well as differences in the partisan preferences of the incumbent may, indeed, 
have substantial real effects on the cost of capital for investment and economic growth. 
 
We think our findings have substantial practical management and public policy implications as 
well as implications for academic researchers. First, PBC considerations and analytical models may have 
a substantial power in explaining the risk perceptions of bondholders and, perhaps, other individuals (e.g., 
banks, multinational corporations, donor government agencies) involved in international capital pricing 
and allocation to the developing world.  Second, future research using PBC models should seek to 
integrate partisan and opportunistic factors rather than treat one or the other in isolation.  Third,   5
developing country governments and political parties more generally might benefit from more active 
engagement and dialog with agencies that otherwise show a tendency to penalize or reward countries with 
different ratings based on a rather simple set of PBC considerations. 
 
Such related issues are relevant, not only to the PBC literature as it is increasingly extended to 
developing countries, but also to broader issues of the relationship between democracy and growth.  
While in the long run democracy undoubtedly is a good in itself, its long-term benefit may be offset by 
the short- to medium-term perception that competitive elections induce costly economic misbehavior of 
both partisan and opportunistic sorts.  To the extent that this perception increases the cost and reduces the 
supply of capital to developing countries, it imposes a spread surcharge on democracy that is still 
nonetheless worth paying. 
   6
1.   Introduction 
RECOMMENDATION:  WE CONTINUE TO RECOMMEND CLIENTS REDUCE EXPOSURE AHEAD OF THE 
ELECTION…The steady decline in Brazilian bond prices turned into panic selling last week.  The sovereign spread (or risk 
premium) on Brazilian USD debt gapped out from 1250 basis points (bp) on Monday (June 17) to 1700 bp by the close on 
Friday (June 21).  Brazilian spreads are now wider than during the country’s currency crisis in January 1999…Bond 
investors are clearly worried about the outcome of the presidential elections in October.  Worker’s Party (PT) candidate Lula 
continues to lead in opinion pools…The widespread perception among market participants seems to be that a Lula 
presidency would put Brazil on a path towards defaulting on its external debt. 
  
    Excerpt from Credit Suisse Private Banking Newsletter to Investors, June 26, 2002 (CSPB, 2002)     
 
It is readily apparent from casual observation of the international investment community that 
political uncertainty matters to those who hold and trade developing country sovereign debt.  The above 
excerpted admonition from Credit Suisse to its investors regarding the anticipated dangers of Brazilian 
debt as the election of Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva (“Lula”) appeared increasingly likely highlights the 
centrality of elections in generating political uncertainty.  Similarly, the Goldman Sachs investment bank 
created a “Lulameter” as the Brazilian election approached, intended to measure the impact of his 
anticipated election on currency markets (Goldman, Sachs, 2002).
1  It is curious, then, that academic 
research has devoted little effort to formalizing, either conceptually or empirically, the effect of elections 
and or likely election outcomes on the price of sovereign debt in developing countries such as Brazil.  
This study attempts to fill that gap by developing an analytical framework grounded in established 
political business cycle (PBC) theory, but applied to the behavior of a group of non-voting, often foreign 
based financial actors, institutional and individual investors holding developing country sovereign bonds 
(“bondholders”).   
Since the seminal papers of Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck (1976) and Tufte (1978), PBC theory has 
been debated largely in the context of industrialized democracies and almost exclusively in the context of 
interactions among domestic political stakeholders, such as between elected incumbents and voters.  
These original models, as well as more recent models developed by Rogoff and Siebert (1988) and 
Rogoff (1990) posited opportunistic politicians using expansionary fiscal, monetary and related policies 
                                                 
1 See Martinez and Santiso (2003) for a thorough case study of the reaction of financial markets to the Brazilian presidential 
election of October, 2002.   7
during elections to boost their chances of retaining office, even if such policies have detrimental 
economic consequences in the post-election period.  PBC models developed by Hibbs (1977, 1987), 
Alesina (1987; 1988), Alesina et al. (1997) and Drazen (2000) also suggest that candidates champion 
economic policies for electoral purposes; however, their policies differ markedly with right-wing 
candidates characteristically emphasizing lower inflation, and left-wing candidates preferring lower 
unemployment.   
While a substantial stream of empirical studies from the US and other industrialized democracies 
has yielded a mixed bag of supporting and contrary results regarding both these opportunistic and partisan 
PBC behaviors, recent reviews of PBC research in Drazen (2000), Imbeau et al. (2001), Franzese (2002) 
and others (e.g., Block and Vaaler, 2004) indicate that there has been much less empirical testing to date 
in developing country settings.  Research in these settings has been based largely on the opportunistic 
rather than partisan PBC branch, and has focused on explanation of domestic interactions between elected 
officials and election policies on the one hand and voters on the other hand.   
Yet, PBCs of a partisan or opportunistic nature may also have important implications for various 
non-voting, often foreign-based actors crucial to developing country investment and economic growth.  
Institutional and individual bondholders based largely in the US, Europe and Japan traded sovereign debt 
instruments of all types worth merely $90 billion in 1990 but almost $1.6 trillion in 2000 (EMTA, 2001).  
These bondholder risk assessments have a direct and increasingly influential impact on the cost and 
availability of capital during election periods in developing countries; yet PBC research has yet to address 
their “voting” behavior during election periods.  
We develop a conceptual framework for understanding how bondholder decisions may be shaped 
by both partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations, and then derive and test two hypotheses from the 
framework using regression analysis of daily bond spread observations for sovereign bonds issued by 19 
developing countries sovereigns holding 19 presidential elections from 1994-2000.  Consistent with the 
framework, we find that bondholders in the run-up to elections perceive higher credit risks in the form of 
larger bond spreads as the likelihood of right-wing incumbents being defeated by left-wing challengers   8
increases.  Interestingly, we also observe that bondholders in the run-up to elections perceive lower credit 
risks in the form of smaller bond spreads as the likelihood of left-wing incumbents being defeated by 
right-wing challengers increases.  Overall, these results suggest that bondholders during election periods 
consider partisan and opportunistic PBC factors, and in certain cases, exact a spread “surcharge” on 
developing countries based on these considerations.  We propose a framework that supports the 
interpretation of these results in the context of PBC theory. 
The remainder of this study is divided into five sections.  Section 2 describes the relevant theory 
and empirical findings for opportunistic and partisan PBCs applied to traditional incumbent government-
domestic voter interactions, and to interactions with the private financial actors of central interest in this 
research.  Section 3 summarizes our conceptual framework for analyzing sovereign bondholder decisions 
using partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations, and derives testable hypotheses.  Section 4 describes 
the empirical methodology for testing these hypotheses.  Section 5 presents descriptive and regression 
analysis results.  Section 6 concludes by discussing the findings’ implications for partisan and 
opportunistic PBC research and policy.   
2.  Research Background 
Opportunistic and Partisan PBC Theory and Empirics 
Traditional partisan PBC models originated with Hibbs (1977, 1987), who argued that politicians 
seeking election tended to adopt economic policies according to ideological preferences.  His explanation 
distinguished the partisan branch of PBC research from an opportunistic branch originating in Nordhaus 
(1975, 1989), who contended that election-period economic policy choices were based more on the 
general support they would generate from voters with homogenous preferences.  While early models 
assumed naïve voters with adaptive expectations and capabilities to anticipate incumbent policies during 
election periods, opportunistic models developed later by Rogoff and Siebert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) 
posited voters with rational expectations and relative ease at anticipating election-period spending sprees 
by politicians.     9
In contrast, according to traditional partisan PBC models, incumbents again use economic policy 
to garner voter support, but based on their partisan political orientation, they will prefer economic policies 
with different emphases to accomplish this end.  In terms of a simple Phillips curve approach, left-wing 
incumbent policies will tend to favor employment at the expense of inflation, while right-wing incumbent 
policies favor inflation at the expense of employment.  Because voter preferences are assumed to be 
heterogeneous based on these types of partisan preferences, such policy differences can generate 
substantial differences in political support during election periods, substantial differences in employment, 
inflation and economic growth after elections, and substantial right-left partisan swings across several 
election periods (Drazen 2000).   
Alesina (1987; 1988) and others (e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal, 1993) refined traditional partisan 
PBC models to be consistent with rational-expectations assumptions.  So-called rational partisan cycle 
(“RPC”) models assume a less exploitable Phillips curve compared to traditional partisan PBC models.  
Thus, Alesina et al. (1997) argued that the main difference between traditional partisan PBC and RPC 
models is that real effects of partisan shifts in government tend to persist in traditional models but is 
temporary in rational models.   
Recent reviews of the PBC research, in Drazen (2000), Imbeau et al., (2001), Franzese (2002) 
chronicle a growing empirical literature with, perhaps, more growth in the opportunistic compared to 
partisan PBC branches, and with more growth in both branches for industrialized compared to developing 
country contexts.  Recent empirical research across various developing country contexts reveals 
consistent support for the existence of PBCs  (e.g., Schuknecht, 1996, 1999, 2000; Block, 2002).   
Relatively few PBC empirical studies address interactions between politicians and private (non-
voting) actors.  Alesina et al. (1997) found partisan political effects on US bond forward rates; Santa-
Clara and Valkanov (2003) suggested that US stock market returns in the post-World War II period were 
actually higher under Democrat rather than Republican governments; and, Bachman’s results (1992) 
linked changes in bias in forward exchange rates to changes in government, though follow-on work by 
Bernhard and Leblang (2002) presented contrary evidence.     10
Fewer, still, are studies that address interactions between politicians and private financial actors 
in developing countries.  Leblang (2002) found that speculative currency attacks were more likely during 
election periods with left- rather than right-wing incumbents, and more likely in the post- rather than pre-
election period.  Block and Vaaler (2004) found that election periods coincided with downgrades of 
sovereign ratings by major credit rating agencies and fluctuating bond spreads, both indicative of 
concerns that incumbents might be or were in fact engaged in opportunistic PBC behavior.  Block et al. 
(2003) elaborated on this insight with an analytical framework integrating both partisan and opportunistic 
PBC considerations for agencies rating developing country sovereign risk during election years.  
Empirical testing of the framework suggested that right-wing incumbents facing election generally enjoy 
higher (more creditworthy) ratings than left-wing incumbents, though other factors, including the prospect 
of incumbent re-election, also had a significant impact on election-period risk assessments by the 
agencies.  These preliminary results suggest that such integrative analytical frameworks may implicate a 
much broader range of private actors, including sovereign bondholders. 
3. Empirical  Background,  Conceptual Framework, and Hypotheses 
Empirical Background 
Brief explanation of institutional practices in the developing country sovereign bond market 
provides helpful background for developing a conceptual framework to predict changes in bond spreads 
due to partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations.  The origins of this sovereign bond market were in 
the LDC debt crisis of the early 1980s and the emergence of so-called “Brady bonds” designed to 
securitize that debt, create secondary markets for it and lower the overall cost of borrowing to sovereigns 
and sub-sovereign individuals by reducing investor liquidity (though not basic default) risks.  In addition 
to Brady bonds, developing country sovereign and sub-sovereign individuals in the 1990s issued new debt 
securities, primarily on European markets, often with face amounts in $ billions.  By 2000, annual trading 
volume in Brady and non-Brady Eurobonds issued by developing country sovereigns and sub-sovereigns 
topped $1.6 trillion or approximately $4.3 billion in daily trades.  Broker-dealers, investment banks, 
governments, insurance companies, pension, hedge and mutual funds, and wealthy individuals comprise   11
this trading secondary market linked electronically and capable of quickly connecting buyers and sellers, 
executing and clearing their trades in “round lots” of at least $2 million (EMTA, 2001). 
Risks associated with holding such sovereign bonds are typically gauged by the market-
determined spreads bondholders are able to command.  Expressed either absolutely (e.g., in Larrian et al., 
1997; CSPB, 2002), or in relative terms (e.g., Block & Vaaler, 2004),
2 bond spreads provide a valid proxy 
for overall risk of default by the sovereign issuer.  Empirical studies by Cantor and Packer (1996a, 1996b) 
as well as numerous industry analyses (e.g., J.P. Morgan, 2000) indicate that both average levels and 
changes in day-to-day spreads for sovereign bonds from industrialized and developing countries are 
significantly and substantially correlated with major credit-rating agency (“agency”) assessments of 
sovereign default risk.  Amadou (2002) also notes the strong relationship between bond spreads and 
default risk, particularly those issued by developing country sovereigns.   
Conceptual Framework:  Overview 
Against this institutional background, we develop a conceptual framework integrating both 
partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations into investors’ reactions to elections in developing 
countries.  Assume a liquid market for sovereign bonds from a given developing country with astute 
institutional and individual bondholders revising on a daily basis their subjective probabilities of credit 
risks related to default by the developing country sovereign.  Assume further that it is during an election 
period with, say, only 90 days left before the final poll.  A 90-day window is primarily illustrative, though 
we note that windows of 60-90 days approximate the length of many general election campaign periods.
3  
For clarity, we designate this pre-election window as T-.  The election occurs on day t=T.  Then, a post-
election period ensues designated as T+.  On any given day, t, during this pre-election period change in 
relative spread for a given developing country bond with respect to both partisan and opportunistic PBC 
considerations is given by: 
                                                 
2 Lamy and Thomson (1988) suggest that relative spreads are a more stable risk measure than absolute spreads especially where 
the general level of interest rates fluctuates substantially.  Consistent with this approach, we define spreads on a foreign sovereign 
bond relative to comparable US Treasuries:  (YieldForeign–YieldU.S.)/YieldU.S. 
3 Consistent with this thinking, our empirical analyses reported below utilize both 90 and 60 day pre-election windows.   12
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where  t S ∆  is the change in spreads on day t, the superscripts (P,O) indicate respectively the change with 
respect to partisan or opportunistic PBC considerations, and the subscripts (r, l) define respectively 
whether the incumbent is from a right-wing or a left-wing party. 
The Partisan Dimension 
  Consider first the partisan term in equation (1),
P
i t S , ∆ .  Assume that a bondholder’s decision rule 
for partisan considerations affecting spreads takes the form: 
(2)  ( ) i T
e
T
P
i t g S , , − + − = ∆ π π
 
where  i T , − π  is the inflation rate on any given day during the pre-election period  for incumbent from party 
i, 
e
T+ π  is the expected inflation rate in the post-election period (T+), and  ) (⋅ g is a function that translates 
the difference within the function into daily changes in spreads.  Equation (2) assumes that the greater the 
difference between expected post-election inflation and the current inflation imposed by party i, the larger 
the change in spreads.  While in theory, these changes are virtually boundless, as a practical matter daily 
changes tend to be small:  In the sample of 19 elections we analyze empirically below, the average daily 
spread change over a 90-day pre-election period was approximately -0.14% indicating a slightly negative 
trend over time (less risk relative to US Treasuries); the maximum daily increase (“max
+”) and decrease 
(“max
-“) were both approximately 20%.   
Recall that a fundamental assumption of partisan PBC theory is that right-wing incumbents are 
willing to suffer higher unemployment for the sake of lower inflation, while left-wing incumbents impose 
the opposite preferences.  Assume, therefore, that  l r π π < in all periods.  Expected post-election inflation 
(
e
T+ π ), thus, becomes an average weighted by the bondholder’s subjective probability (λ) that the right-
wing party will win on election day: 
(3)  1 0 ) 1 ( ≤ ≤ − + = + λ π λ λπ π for l r
e
T    13
Substituting (3) into (2) yields the bondholder’s decision rule with respect to partisan considerations: 
(4)  [] () i l r
P
i t g S π π λ λπ − − + = ∆ ) 1 ( ,  
  The implications of this decision rule depend on which party is incumbent.  For right-wing 
incumbents (i = r),  0 1 , > ∆ ⇒ <
P
r t S λ , if there is any positive probability of a right-wing incumbent losing to 
a left-wing contender, spreads will tend to rise compared to the case where right-wing incumbent victory 
is certain.  We assume that as an election nears, the bondholder becomes increasingly certain as to the 
outcome, and λ thus converges to 1 or 0 (though this does not exclude close calls or surprises, as we 
discuss below).  As  0 , 1 , → ∆ →
P
r t S λ , and as  + → ∆ → max , 0 ,
P
r t S λ .  That is, as the bondholder’s certainty 
that a right-wing incumbent will be retained increases, the required increase in spread declines towards 
zero.  On the other hand, as the bondholder’s certainty of a left-wing victory over a right-wing incumbent 
increases, spreads, too, will increase, bounded only by the empirical maximum. 
  The bondholder’s decision rule in the case of left-wing incumbents (i = l) is the inverse of the 
right-wing incumbent case.  In the left-wing incumbent case,  0 0 , < ∆ ⇒ >
P
l t S λ .  Thus, as  − → ∆ → max , 1 ,
P
l t S λ , 
and as  0 , 0 , → ∆ →
P
l t S λ .  For any positive probability that a right-wing challenger will prevail over a left-
wing incumbent, spreads will fall compared to the case where left-wing incumbent victory is certain.  As 
the bondholder’s certainty of right-wing victory increases, expected post-election inflation falls 
increasingly below pre-election inflation, and the daily decrease in spreads approaches the empirical 
maximum.  On the other hand, when the bondholder’s certainty of a left-wing incumbent being retained 
increases, change in spreads diminishes to zero.   
The Opportunistic Dimension 
  During election periods, opportunistic PBC considerations are also assumed to influence the 
bondholder’s perceptions of developing country bonds with default risk in equation (1).  Opportunistic 
PBC theory asserts that incumbents are identical, regardless of party, in their motivation to retain office, 
and in their incentives to use expansionary monetary, fiscal and or related policies as a means to retain 
office.  As Franzese (2002) and others suggest, however, opportunistic incentives may be modified by the   14
incumbent’s likelihood of victory going into the campaign.  Incumbents certain of victory will have fewer 
incentives to resort to opportunistic policies compared to incumbents with their backs against the wall.  
This assertion is in keeping with Schultz (1995), who shows that expectations of incumbent party victory 
in British parliamentary elections are negatively correlated with the likelihood of expansionary economic 
policies in the run-up period, as well as with Block, Ferree, and Singh (2001), who make a similar point 
in the African context.   
The linkage between incumbent electoral expectations and the likelihood of opportunism is 
important to our framework:  It links bondholder assessments of incumbent re-election and opportunism 
in the pre-election period, to post-election inflation expectations.  Specifically, assume that for an 
incumbent of either party, post-election inflation will exceed pre-election inflation if the incumbent is 
perceived to be facing defeat at the polls.  That is, the incumbent’s incentive to engage in opportunistic 
pre-election manipulation of the economy (e.g., a pre-election spending spree to be financed by higher 
inflation in the post-election period) increases with the probability of defeat.   
  This opportunistic dynamic affects the bondholder’s perception of default risk and, thus, 
influences pre-election trends in spreads.  To see how in our framework, recall again that any change in 
spreads demanded by the bondholder will be a positive function of the difference between pre-election 
actual inflation and expected post-election inflation: 
(5)  ( ) i T
e
i T
O
i t h S , , , − + − = ∆ π π  
In equation (5), expected inflation exceeds pre-election inflation as a positive function of the subjective 
probability of the incumbent losing office. That is: 
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 where  i T i , −
+ >π π  is a relative statement indicating that, for a given incumbent party, post-election 
inflation increases (
+
i π ) beyond pre-election inflation for that party.  Equation (6) states simply that the   15
bondholder expects post-election inflation to increase for either party beyond its current level if the 
incumbent’s defeat seems likely compared to where its re-election is a certainty. 
  Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) yields the bondholder’s decision rule with respect to 
opportunistic PBC considerations: 
(7) 
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As in the partisan case, empirical implications of this decision rule with respect to opportunistic PBC 
theory depend on which party is the incumbent.  For right-wing incumbents, equation (7) implies that, for 
0 , 1 , > ∆ <
O
r t S λ .  As  0 , 1 → ∆ →
O
t S λ , while as 
+ → ∆ → max , 0
O
t S λ .  That is, for any positive 
probability of a left-wing challenger replacing a right-wing incumbent, spreads will increase compared to 
the case of certain right-wing incumbent victory.  Similarly, for any positive probability of a left-wing 
incumbent losing to a right-wing challenger, spreads will increase compared to the case of certain left-
wing incumbent victory.   
Equation (1) requires that these partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations be merged to 
determine the bondholder’s overall reaction to impending elections.  Table 1 summarizes our predictions 
about bondholder reactions under various circumstances defined above.  The columns of Table 1 
distinguish between bondholder considerations where there is a right-wing (“r”) versus left-wing (“l”) 
incumbent, while the rows distinguish between electoral expectations of certain right-wing victory (λ ≅ 
1), mixed expectations of right- or left-wing victory (0 < λ < 1), and certain left-wing victory (λ ≅ 0). 
Each of the six cells includes a pair of directional effects on spreads (“P, O”), indicating, respectively, 
their partisan or opportunistic PBC origins.  Increase (+) and decrease (-) effects on spreads are stated in 
comparison to the “base case” of certain incumbent retention, where partisan and opportunistic PBC 
effects captured in our framework are nil (0,0). 
*** Insert Table 1 approximately here ***   16
Note that for right-wing incumbents, our framework suggests that partisan and opportunistic 
considerations reinforce one another.  For left-wing incumbents, however, the two work in opposition to 
one another.  Where, in the case of right-wing incumbents the pair of PBC considerations are both 
positive (+,+), we predict a positive trend in spreads on sovereign bonds compared to the base case of 
certain right-wing re-election.  Where in the case of left-wing incumbents the pair of PBC considerations 
are negative for partisan but positive for opportunistic effects (-,+), the overall outcome is ambiguous à 
priori.  Compared to the base case of certain left-wing incumbent retention, the overall change in spreads, 
if any, will depend empirically on whether bondholder decisions are systematically dominated by partisan 
(-) or opportunistic (+) PBC considerations. 
Hypotheses 
To test these proposed relationships between PBC considerations and change in spreads, we must 
first modify electoral expectations operator, λ.  To begin, we first recognize that λ, in practice, will rarely 
equal exactly 0 or 1.  Moreover, we do not directly observe subjective assessments by bondholders 
regarding the probability of a right-wing victory.  We, thus, construct λ based on the assumption that 
bondholders are generally able to predict with reasonable accuracy the outcomes of elections when 
elections are not close.
4  Recall, as well, that bondholders in sovereign debt markets may update and trade 
on their assessments daily.  Brazil’s 2002 presidential election experience would appear to validate this 
construction.  In that case, where frequent polling data were available, Martinez and Santiso (2003) 
demonstrate a high correlation between Lula’s lead in the polls and increases in spreads on Brazilian debt 
during the months leading up to Lula’s election. 
With these assumptions, we modify λ to take on one of three discrete ordinal values.  We infer 
that 
hi λ λ =  in either of two scenarios:  If a right-wing incumbent wins by a large margin (right-wing base 
case); or if a left-wing incumbent loses by a large margin.  As described in greater detail below, we define 
                                                 
4  Ideally, we would have regular polling data from each country for each election in our sample.  As such data are unavailable to 
us, we are effectively making the assumption that those polling data were available to bondholders at the time, and that they 
formed and updated their subjective probabilities based on those polls.  We are thus “seeing” the polling data retroactively 
through bondholder eyes.   17
a “large” margin to be an election outcome in which the winner’s vote share exceeds the loser’s by more 
than 3%.  Similarly, we infer that 
lo λ λ =  in either of two scenarios:  If a right-wing incumbent loses by a 
large margin; or if a left-wing incumbent wins by a large margin (left-wing base case).  In the final two 
scenarios, the margin of victory for right- or left-wing incumbent is not large but a “close call” with a 
winning margin for left- or right-wing incumbents of less than 3%.  In these scenarios, λ = λ
med.
 5 
For right-wing incumbents, the framework now predicts a clear link between the ordinal 
hierarchy of election-day victory expectations and change in spreads on developing country sovereign 
bonds: Compared to the base case of likely right-wing incumbent retention, both partisan and 
opportunistic PBC considerations generate mutually reinforcing and increasingly positive changes in 
bondholder spreads: 
H1:  Given a right-wing incumbent, pre- election bond spread changes compared to the base case will 
be positive and increasing in magnitude as the likelihood of re-election falls from high to low 
(i.e.,  lo med hi
O P
r T
O P
r T
O P
r T S S S
λ λ λ λ λ λ = − = − = − ∆ < ∆ < ∆
,
,
,
,
,
, ). 
 
For left-wing incumbents, the framework predicts contradicting partisan and opportunistic 
directions in spread as we move from the base case of likely left-wing incumbent victory (λ
lo) to ever 
greater likelihoods of right-wing challenger victory (λ
med and λ
hi).  The increasing likelihood of a partisan 
switch from left- to right-wing engenders a decrease in the spread while the increasing likelihood of an 
incumbent resorting to opportunistic interventions to stave off defeat engenders an increase in spreads.  
We, therefore, have no à priori basis for asserting that either partisan or opportunistic PBC effects will 
systematically dominate the other.  Thus, we presume for prediction purposes only that the two effects 
will cancel each other out:  Pre-election bond spread changes in developing countries with left-wing 
incumbents will exhibit no significant differences across different levels of λ: 
                                                 
5 Changing the definition of “close call” election to victory margins of less than 5% or 10% does not change the overall results of 
our analyses reported in Tables 1 and 2 below.  Results using these alternative measures are available from the authors on 
request.   18
H2:  Given a left-wing incumbent, pre-election bond spread changes compared to the base case will be 
neither positive nor negative, regardless of the incumbent’s likelihood of re-election (i.e., 
lo hi
O P
l T
O P
l T
O P
l T S S S
λ λ λ λ = − − = − ∆ = ∆ = ∆
,
,
,
,
,
, ). 
 
  Rejection of this second hypothesis would also shed important light on the relative impact of 
partisan versus opportunistic PBC considerations from a bondholder perspective.  Increasingly negative 
changes in spreads from the base case of certain left-wing incumbent retention would indicate the 
predominance of partisan considerations, while increasingly positive changes would indicate the 
predominance of opportunistic considerations. 
4. Methodology 
Spreads Model and Hypothesis Tests 
To test our hypotheses predicting pre-election period change in developing country sovereign 
bond spreads based on partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations, we define the following equation: 
(8) 
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In equation (8), the dependent variable, Spreadcty, is the market-determined credit-spread relative to a 
comparable US Treasury security on day t of year y for a sovereign bond issued by developing country c.   
Dayt is a numeric counter for each day t in a 90-day span comprising the 90 days before the election and 
the polling day itself.
6  As a check on the robustness of our results, we re-estimate equation (8) with a 60-
day window.  The GovRbegincy term is a 0-1 indicator distinguishing pre-election incumbent government 
partisan orientations (1 if the pre-election incumbent government of country c in year y is right-wing; 0 if 
left-wing).  λD is an indicator term intended to capture bondholders’ subjective probability of a right-
wing victory.  It takes one of three values: 
                                                 
6 By “election day” or “polling day” we mean the final day for electors to cast ballots in the general (rather than preliminary or 
primary polls) election.  If there are multiple general election polling dates for purposes of establishing a majority victor, we 
mean the final “run-off” election date.   19
 
 
 
The terms in equation (8), permit us to derive slope estimates for each of the six cells in our 
bondholder framework developed above (Table 1): 
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The also permit tests of the two hypotheses, which reduce to:  
H1:  β4 + β5 < 0 
7 
  H2:  β4 = 0 
8 
 
Data Sources and Sampling 
To test these hypotheses we collected several types of data.  First, we collected data on 
presidential elections held during the 1987-2000 period using the World Bank’s Database of Political 
Institutions (“DPI”) (version 3, described in Beck et al. 2001) a database providing comprehensive 
information through 1997 on election dates, electoral systems, electoral competitiveness, and candidate 
partisan orientation.  Where the DPI database proved to be incomplete for certain elections held between 
                                                 
7 H1 above is the reduced form of the following inequality:  β1 + β3 + β4 + β5 < β1 + β3 < β1 + β3 - β4 - β5. 
8 H2 above is the reduced form of the following equality:    β1 - β4 ≅ β1 ≅ β1 + β4.   
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1998 and 2000, we turned to two alternative sources:  The International Foundation for Election Systems 
(“IFES”) (2002); and the on-line version of the Political Reference Almanac 2001-2002 edition 
(“Polisci.com”) (2002).  Election-related information from these alternative sources were sampled using 
the same criteria as the DPI unless otherwise noted below.  From the DPI, IFES and Polisci.com 
databases, we extracted dates of presidential elections where direct popular votes or indirect votes of 
legislators or specialized electors chose chief executives judged to exert substantial executive 
governmental power rather than mere state ceremonial duties as presidential heads of state tend to have in 
parliamentary systems. 
Our decision to exclude non-presidential systems, most notably, parliamentary electoral systems, 
followed from data observation and estimation issues.  Elections in countries with presidential systems 
tend to follow fixed schedules.  By contrast, executives in parliamentary systems often have substantial 
discretion in choosing the date of their re-election within an existing term in office.  This distinction can 
lead to endogeneity problems in empirical models of political business cycle effects.  The DPI database 
also includes assessments of executive electoral competitiveness as measured by the extent of multi-party 
competition.  The measure ranges from 1 (least competitive executive electoral systems) to 7 (most 
competitive executive electoral systems).  All of the presidential elections to be sampled score 6 or 7 on 
this scale, indicating that they were “real” elections.  DPI classifications of competitive elections in 1997 
were judged to continue through 2000.   
Our empirical analysis relies on identification of the partisan (left- versus right-wing) orientation 
of electoral candidates, particularly incumbent (government) candidates.  The DPI, IFES and Polisci.com 
databases provided information on the partisan orientation of candidates, including characterization of 
their parties as left-wing, right-wing, centrist- or otherwise-oriented.  Beck et al. (2001) explain the 
decision rules used for this DPI categorization.  Two types of classification criteria were used:  content of 
party names; and judgments by academic and professional commentators.  In terms of content, parties 
were defined as “right-wing” based on whether terms such as “conservative” or “Christian democratic” 
were included in their names.  A “left-wing” definition followed from party names with terms such as   21
“communist” or “Marxist” or “socialist” or “social democratic.”  Failing a clear indication based on 
content, academic and professional commentator judgments were used.  The “centrist” classification 
followed from no clear criteria based on party-name, thus academic and professional judgment was the 
primary source.  Centrist parties advocated the strengthening of private enterprise but also supported 
some substantial redistributive role for government.  Parties were placed in a fourth classification as 
“other” if both name-based and commentator-based criteria could not clearly classify them into left-wing, 
right-wing, or centrist-orientations.  Using IFES and Polisci.com databases, we applied the same criteria 
to ascertain preliminary classifications for post-1997 elections not covered by DPI. 
Noting the increased subjectivity associated with the centrist classification, as well as the 
similarities of central propositions in economic policy between centrist and right-wing governments, we 
chose to collapse centrist parties into the right-wing classification; thus, our final classifications are 
limited to two:  left-wing and right-wing (including centrist).  Where an incumbent party in our sample 
was classified as “other” by the DPI—and there were only three such instances—we consulted IFES and 
Polisci.com for additional information on which to make a judgment of left- versus right-wing party 
orientation.
9  These sources also provided the final election results that we use to construct λ. 
Using Bloomberg International (2002) on-line data sources, we collected data on bond yields for 
large-size, dollar-denominated bonds issued by developing country sovereigns from 1994-2000.  Where 
possible, we chose Brady bonds with the longest trading history available to us for each sovereign in our 
sample.
10  We also noted the comparable US Treasury bond yield, either actual or synthetic from a 
                                                 
9 Results excluding observations we re-classified from “other” are completely consistent with those reported below, and are 
available from the authors on request. 
10 The sovereign bonds in our sample included:  1) Republic of Argentina, Series FRB, Issued 03/31/93, Maturing 03/29/05, 
Amount $8.5 billion, Coupon LIBOR + 0.8725%, Listing in Dusseldorf; 2) Federal Republic of Brazil, Series 20Y, Issued 
04/15/94, Maturing 04/15/14, Amount $7.4 billion, Coupon 8%, Listing in Luxemburg; 3) Bulgaria, Series A, Issued 7/28/94, 
Maturing 07/28/24, Amount $1.7 billion, Coupon LIBOR + 0.8725%, No Listing; 4) Republic of Chile, No Series, Issued 
4/28/99, Maturing 04/28/09, Amount $500 million, Coupon 6.875%, Listing in Luxemburg; 5) Republic of Colombia, No Series, 
Issued 2/23/94, Maturing 02/23/04, Amount $250 million, Coupon 7.25%, No Listing; 6) United Mexican States, Series A, 
Issued 03/28/90, Maturing 12/31/19, Amount $6.2 billion, Coupon 6.25%, Listing in Luxemburg; 7) Republic of Philippines, 
Series B, Issued 12/01/92, Maturing 12/01/17, Amount $1.7 billion, Coupon 6.5%, Listing in Luxemburg; 8) Republic of Poland, 
Series PDIB, Issued 10/27/94, Maturing 12/01/17, Amount $2.7 billion, Coupon 6%, Listing in Luxemburg; 9) Ministry of 
Finance of Russia, Series IV, Issued 05/14/93, Maturing 01/14/03, Amount $3.5 billion, Coupon 3%, No Listing; 10) Republic of 
South Africa, No Series, Issued 05/19/99, Maturing 05/19/09, Amount $1.5 billion, Coupon 9.125%, Listing in Luxemburg; 11) 
Banco Central del Uruguay, Series B$, Issued 02/19/91, Maturing 01/19/07, Amount $448 million, Coupon LIBOR+0.875%,   22
constructed yield curve.  With these data sources, we calculated the spread for each sovereign bond 
relative to comparable U.S. Treasury bonds during the 90 days before a presidential election.  The 
resulting 90-day sample comprised a balanced panel of 1,710 daily bond spread observations for 19 
elections held in 12 countries from 1994-2000.  We also created a sub-sample based on a 60-day window, 
which resulted in 1,140 daily bond spread observations for the same elections, countries and years. 
Estimation Strategy 
Given the high (daily) frequency of the time series and cross-sectional groupings (elections) in 
our panel, we used a weighted general estimating equation (“GEE”) approach to estimate equation (8).  
The GEE procedure provides general linear model estimates, with independent correlation structures and 
semi-robust standard errors for defined groups in the sample cross section.  This permits us first to define 
groups in each sample – 19 election groups in our spreads model.  The GEE procedure also allows for 
higher-order autocorrelation adjustment of error terms for observations in each election group, with 
additional adjustments for heteroskedasticity in the cross-section.
11   
A second consideration in estimating equation (8) was the probable influence of outliers resulting 
from unknown idiosyncratic events, which could confound estimation of broader trends in the data.  
Preliminary analyses of the 90-day (60-day) sample using OLS permitted calculation of Cook’s Distance 
measures indicating the presence of 310 (174) gross outlier spread observations distributed evenly across 
six elections (Argentina, 1995, 1999; Brazil, 1994; Mexico, 2000; Russia, 2000; and Venezuela, 1998).   
To mitigate the possible confounding effects these outliers may have, we employed to a two-step 
procedure similar to robust regression.  In the first step, we used the OLS estimation to identify gross 
outliers with Cook’s Distance measures more than 100x the mean value, which were approximately all 
observations with Cook’s D > 1.  In the second step, we gave the gross outliers a zero-weight and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Listing in Luxemburg; and 12) Republic of Venezuela, Series DL, Issued 12/18/90, Maturing 12/18/07, Amount $5.2 billion, 
Coupon LIBOR+0.875%, Listing in Luxemburg. 
11 We obtained more efficient results using an AR(9) correction.    23
weighed the remaining observations with the inverse of their absolute Cook’s Distance measure.  The 
resulting estimation was, therefore, a weighted GEE.
12   
5. Results  
 
Tables 2-4 report results from estimation of sovereign bond spreads using equation (8):  Table 2 
reports the coefficients from 60- and 90-day weighted GEE analyses; Table 3 reports results from slope 
estimation of spreads for each of the six possible outcomes developed in our Table 1 framework; and 
Table 4 reports results from formal tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
****   Insert Table 2 Approximately Here   **** 
Table 2’s weighted GEE analyses yielded coefficients for the key terms in equation (8) (β1 
through β5) that were consistently significant at commonly acceptable statistical levels (p < 0.01) and 
exhibited consistent signs whether we use 60- or 90-day pre-election windows.  This consistency in sign 
and significance proved robust to the inclusion of two additional controls.  First we added a 0-1 indicator 
term to control for possible differences between spreads on bonds with floating (LIBOR+) rather than 
fixed rate coupons.  Second, we added a control for the “background” sovereign risk in each country at 
the beginning of an election year.  This background sovereign risk control took the form of a number 
between 16 and 0 inclusive, and representing the 17 ordinal rating levels commonly used by major credit-
rating agencies to assess the “ceiling” sovereign risk on long-term foreign currency denominated 
instruments issued by individuals domiciled in a particular developing country.  We used the rating from 
Moody’s Investor Services published on December 31 of the year preceding an election (AAA = 16, Aa1 
= 15, Aa2 = 14,…, B2 = 2, B3 = 1, C = 0).
13   
                                                 
12 This is precisely the procedure performed in “robust regression” (rreg) procedure in Stata (Stata Corp 2001), from which we 
derived our regression weights for the weighted GEE.  Unweighted GEE analysis using a 90-day window yields key coefficient 
estimates (β1 through β5) with signs identical to those reported using weighted GEE.  Unweighted GEE analysis using a 60-day 
60-day window yields key coefficient estimates (β1 through β5) with signs identical to those reported using weighted GEE in four 
cases (β1, β2, β4, β5).  Standard error estimates are substantially higher with these unweighted GEE analyses, thus, reducing 
statistical significance.  These unweighted GEE results for 60-day and 90-day samples are available from the authors on request.  
13 Signs and significance obtained in unweighted GEE analyses are also unchanged with inclusion of these two additional 
controls.  These weighted and unweighted GEE results are available from the authors on request.   24
Table 3 used the coefficient estimates in Table 2, individually or in linear combination, to 
calculate slopes in spreads associated with each of the cells of our framework summarized in Table 1.  
Table 4 reports results from formal testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2 using the slope estimates.    
****   Insert Tables 3 and 4 Approximately Here   **** 
Overall, Table 3 indicates a hierarchy of response by bondholders to differing likelihoods of incumbent 
re-election for both right- and left-wing incumbents.  Hypothesis 1 drew on the reinforcing effects of 
partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations for right-wing incumbents when predicting this hierarchy 
of response.  Against the base case of likely right-wing incumbent re-election (λ
hi), we saw that trends in 
pre-election spreads are increasingly positive, indicating greater risk, as the likelihood of right-wing 
incumbent re-election fell (λ
med and λ
lo).   
Recall that we made no specific prediction about the sign and significance for the base case. With 
90- and 60-day pre-election windows, the base case spreads slope was negative and significant (p < 
0.01).
14  The 90-day (60-day) base case slope of -0.00086 (-0.00195) for right-wing incumbents likely to 
be re-elected is cut in half to a statistically significant (p < 0.01) -0.00043 (-0.00095) when right-wing re-
election goes from likely to a close call.  The negative trend in pre-election spreads disappeared when the 
right-wing incumbent was likely to be defeated by the left-wing challenger.  Hypothesis 1 test results 
reported in Table 4 generally confirmed the view that pre-election trends in spreads were increasingly 
positive as the likelihood of right-wing re-election fell, though the level of statistical significance was 
different for 90-day (p < 0.01) versus 60-day (p < 0.10) pre-election windows.   
                                                 
14 Indeed, slopes for pre-election spreads in five of six possible cases in Table 3 exhibit negative point estimates of varying 
magnitude.  This generally negative trend in the run-up to polling is consistent with the downward sloping trend in pre-election 
slopes Block and Vaaler (2004) observed.  They connected this trend to a larger pre-election spreads “bubble” phenomenon 
extending over a six-month period:  From approximately 180 to 90 days before elections, spreads on several developing country 
sovereign bonds increased, only to decrease substantially in the final run-up to polling.  The resulting “bubble” was interpreted as 
a temporary risk premium on developing country debt associated with rising and then declining uncertainty about electoral 
outcomes and the extent of opportunistic behavior by incumbents.  Recurring negative trends here, however, have a different 
interpretation given our framework:  As uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes are resolved in the final run-up to polling, 
steeper or shallower (or, in one case slightly positive) spreads slopes reflect bondholder consideration of both opportunistic and 
partisan effects. 
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  We did not predict but nonetheless found again a hierarchy of bond spreads corresponding to left-
wing incumbents with differing electoral expectations.  Recall that Hypothesis 2 predicted that, against 
the base case of likely left-wing incumbent re-election (λ
lo), trends in pre-election spreads would show no 
significant trends as the likelihood of left-wing incumbent re-election fell (λ
med and λ
hi).  As the likelihood 
of left-wing incumbent re-election fell from likely to close call to unlikely, our framework suggested that 
partisan and opportunistic PBC considerations would work at cross purposes:  Partisan PBC 
considerations would drive down spreads, indicating bondholder expectations of economic policies 
typically championed by right-wing candidates; but opportunistic PBC considerations would drive up 
spreads as left-wing incumbents felt increasingly pressured to stave off defeat by the right-wing with pre-
election spending sprees.  With no reason à priori to conclude that partisan or opportunistic 
considerations would dominate, we predicted in Hypothesis 2 that they would be approximately equal in 
force and cancel each other out. 
Results in Tables 3 and 4 clearly rejected this prediction, and suggested instead that bondholders 
weighed partisan substantially more than opportunistic PBC considerations in developing country 
elections with left-wing incumbents.  In the left-wing incumbent base case, spreads were either flat (60-
day window) or slightly positive (90-day window), depending on the pre-election window chosen.  
Compared to this base case of likely left-wing incumbent victory (λ
lo), spreads trended significantly and 
substantially negative as the likelihood of right-wing challenger victory increased (λ
med and λ
hi).   The 90-
day (60-day) base case slope of 0.00065 (-0.00044) changed to a statistically significant (p < 0.01) -
0.00872 (-0.00758) when left-wing re-election expectations went from likely to a close call.  That 
negative slope roughly doubled to -0.01472 (-0.01810) and remained statistically significant (p < 0.01) 
when left-wing incumbent’s chances of re-election fell from close call to unlikely.  In this context, it came 
as no surprise that test results in Table 4 rejected Hypothesis 2; indeed, we confirmed through pair-wise 
comparison that the increasingly negative slopes corresponding to increasingly dim chances of left-wing   26
incumbents (λ
lo to λ
med to λ
hi) were statistically significant from each other (p < 0.01) for both 90-day and 
60-day pre-election windows. 
Practical implications of the trends we observe in pre-election spreads more generally are 
illustrated concretely through two case examples drawn from our sample.  Figure 1 graphs the absolute 
yield and relative spreads for Argentine sovereign bonds 180 days before and after the May 15,
 1995 
presidential election.  Carlos Menem was re-elected to office by a large margin at the final poll, which in 
terms of Table 3, Column 2 implies the “right-incumbent, λ
hi” cell.  Relative bond spreads and absolute 
yields during the 90 days before elections exhibit a negative trend, which is consistent with the negative 
slope we also predict.  Interestingly, though, our predicted negative slope is less pronounced than the 
actual slope illustrated in Figure 1:   Our results predict a decrease of approximately 60 basis points in the 
final 90 days prior to election, while actual yields came down by 550 basis points in the last 90 days.
15  
With Argentine outstanding foreign debt of approximately $99 billion at the end of 1995, the implied 
decrease in the cost of funding such debt (60 basis points) represents a saving of approximately $594 
million annually. 
****   Insert Figures 1 and 2 Approximately Here   **** 
Contrast the Argentine case of right-wing incumbency and the expectation of re-election with the 
case of Polish presidential elections on October 8, 2000.  Graphs of relative spreads and absolute 
domestic yields on Polish government sovereign bonds during this period are presented in Figure 2.  This 
election saw the left-wing government of Aleksander Kwasniewski being re-elected to office by a large 
margin.  In terms of Table 3, Column 2, this implies the “left-incumbent, λ
lo” cell.  Here, spreads are 
predicted to have a slightly positive slope throughout the 90-day pre-election period.  Actual results 
follow this prediction quite closely.  We predict an increase of roughly 38 basis points over the last 90 
                                                 
15 90 days before the election, the yield on Argentina’s series FRB sovereign bond maturing in March 2003 stood at 22.16% 
while US Treasuries of comparable maturity yielded 7.41%, implying a relative spread of approximately 1.99.  Based on the 
weighted GEE analysis using a 90-day pre-election window (Tables 2-3, Column 2), we predict for elections with a right 
incumbent (r) and a high likelihood of re-election (λ
hi) a negative daily relative spreads slope coefficient of  -0.00086 ((β1 + β3 + 
β4 + β5).  Over a 90 day period, relative spreads are predicted to decrease by approximately 0.08 (-0.00086* 90 = -0.0774).  This   27
days prior to election. The actual increase in the yield on the Polish series FRB sovereign bond used in 
our sample in the 90-day pre-election period was 30 basis points.
16 With Polish outstanding foreign debt 
of approximately $63 billion at the end of 2000, the implied increase in the cost of funding such debt (30 
basis points) is approximately $189 million annually.  Small differences in the likelihood of re-election as 
well as differences in the partisan preferences of the incumbent may, indeed, have substantial real effects 
on the cost of capital for investment and economic growth. 
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
Our study contributes conceptually and empirically to PBC research by broadening the field of 
actors and election-related outcomes that may be implicated by its behavioral predictions.  PBC theories 
typically characterize politicians, voters and their interaction around elections, restricting themselves to 
particular characterizations of each group.  Empirically, this is typically investigated using either partisan 
or opportunistic PBC perspectives, but not both.  In expanding the purview of PBC theory to include non-
voting private actors, we specifically allowed them to be cognizant of incentives for economic 
(mis)behavior related both to distinct left- versus right-wing partisan orientations and to incumbent 
opportunism that is non-partisan in nature.     
We found support for hypotheses related to bondholders and the risk premia they demand for 
holding sovereign debt from developing countries during election periods.  We found that bondholders 
acted conditional on the partisan orientation of the incumbent government and the likelihood of its 
success on election-day.  Bond spreads (and the implied risk perception they represent) declined faster 
during pre-election periods when a right-wing incumbent was likely to be re-elected compared to when it 
was in a close call election or in an election where it was likely to be ousted.  Pre-election spreads for 
sovereigns with left-wing governments also exhibited a hierarchy conditioned on the likelihood of victory 
on election-day.  The final run-up to polling saw increasingly steep declines in spreads as the likelihood 
                                                                                                                                                             
implies decrease in relative spreads from 1.99 to 1.91 or a decrease in the yield on the Argentine sovereign bond from 22.16% to 
21.56%, assuming no change in the relevant US Treasury yield.    28
of left-wing incumbent re-election fell.  In terms of our conceptual framework, this result evidenced the 
apparent domination of partisan over opportunistic PBC considerations for bondholders.  
These findings raise several broader questions about election-related partisanship and 
opportunism, and their impact on the cost of capital for developing countries.  Bonds issued by sovereign 
and sub-sovereign individuals are an increasingly important means of financing public and private 
investment and growth.  If incumbent political leaders in developing countries are prone to creating 
PBCs—as a growing literature suggests they are—and if outside observers such as bondholders and other 
private financial actors are aware of that potential, then such behavior or even its perception might have 
dramatic and previously unconsidered effects on the cost of foreign capital.  In an era of financial 
globalization, such costs (or benefits) may be substantial, particularly as competitive elections become 
increasingly frequent events among the nascent democracies of the developing world. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 See previous footnote.  90 days prior to the 2000 presidential election, Poland’s Series PDIB sovereign bond, maturing in 
December 2017, yielded 8.18% while yields on U.S. Treasuries of comparable maturity stood at 6.20%.  On election day, yield 
on this Polish sovereign bond had increased to 8.48%.    29
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TABLE 1 
 
Predicted Directions of Pre-Election Changes in Relative Bond Spreads Based on Partisan and 
Opportunistic PBC Considerations 
 
 
Incumbent Partisan Orientation → 
Bondholder Electoral Expectation ↓ 
r (Right-Wing)  l (Left-Wing) 
 
λ ≅ 1 (Right-Wing Expected to Win) 
 
 
(0,0)  
Right-Wing 
Base Case 
 
(-,+) 
Compared to 
Left-Wing  
Base Case 
 
0 < λ < 1 (Mixed Expectations) 
 
 
(+,+)  
Compared to 
Right-Wing  
Base Case 
 
(-,+)  
Compared to 
Left-Wing  
Base Case 
 
λ ≅ 0 (Left-Wing Expected to Win) 
 
 
(+,+) 
Compared to 
Right-Wing  
Base Case 
 
(0,0)  
Left-Wing 
Base Case 
  
  Predicted direction of change in spread based PBC considerations:  (Partisan, Opportunistic).   
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TABLE 2 
 
Regression Results, Dependent Variable: Sovereign Bond Spreads Relative to Comparable U.S. 
Treasuries 60 and 90 Days Before Election, 1994–2000 
a 
 
 
Period before Election →  60 days  90 days 
Estimator → 
Coefficient ↓ 
(1) 
GEE 
b 
(2) 
GEE 
b 
Day [β1]  -0.00758*** -0.00872*** 
 (0.00112)  (0.00009) 
GovRbegin [β2]  1.21572*** 1.32841*** 
 (0.02750)  (0.00268) 
Day * GovRbegin [β3]  0.00663*** 0.00829*** 
 (0.00123)  (0.00010) 
Day * λD [β4]  -0.00713*** -0.00938*** 
 (0.00108)  (0.00009) 
Day * GovRbegin * λD [β5]  0.00613*** 0.00895*** 
 (0.00120)  (0.00010) 
Constant [β0] 0.01746  0.05528 
 (0.05517)  (0.10134) 
N  1140 1710 
Wald χ
2  1.76e+07 4.29E+05 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
(a)  Countries (year of election) in sample include:  Argentina (1995, 1999), Brazil (1994, 1998), Bulgaria (1996), Chile (1999), 
Colombia (1994, 1998), Mexico (1994, 2000), Peru (2000), Philippines (1998), Poland (1995, 2000), Russia (1996, 2000), 
Uruguay (1999), and Venezuela (1998, 2000).  These 19 presidential elections occurred over 1994-2000.  Not reported are 
estimates for country and year dummies included in each specification.  Results are robust to re-estimation with inclusion of 
controls for sovereign credit rating published by Moody’s Investor Services on December 31 of the year before election (AAA = 
16, Aa1 = 15, Aa2 = 14, …, B2 = 2, B3 = 1, C = 0), and for fixed versus floating (LIBOR +) rate (1 if floating rate, 0 otherwise). 
These additional results are available from the authors on request. 
 
(b) Results in Columns 1 and 2 are based on a weighted population-averaged panel data model.  Stata’s (Stata Corp 2001) General 
Estimating Equations (“GEE”) procedure provides general linear model estimates, allows for independent correlation structures 
for each of the 19 election groups, and provides semi-robust standard errors.  The specifications reported above include country 
and year indicator variables, semi-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering and equation error terms adjusted for first through 
ninth-order auto-correlation (AR9). In order to account for gross outliers, a weighted GEE procedure was used, where the weight 
assigned to each observation is obtained from prior analysis using robust regression techniques.  310 of the 1710 observations in 
Column 2 (174 of the 1140 observations in Column 1) were identified as gross outliers and received a weight of zero in the 
weighted GEE procedure.  These gross outliers were distributed in an approximately even manner among elections in Argentina 
(1995, 1999), Brazil (1994), Mexico (2000), Russia (2000), and Venezuela (1998).  These additional results are available from 
the authors on request.   34
TABLE 3 
 
Linear Combinations: Sovereign Bond Spreads Relative to Comparable U.S. Treasuries 60 and 90 
Days Before Election, 1994–2000 
a 
 
 
Period before Election → 
Coefficient ↓ 
60 days  90 days 
base case: left incumbent, λ
lo  -0.00044  0.00065*** 
[β1 - β4] (0.00036)  (0.00003) 
close-call:  left incumbent, λ
med  -0.00758*** -0.00872*** 
[β1] (0.00112)  (0.00009) 
right-victory:  left incumbent, λ
hi  -0.01472*** -0.01810*** 
[β1 + β4] (0.00217)  (0.00019) 
base-case: right incumbent, λ
hi  -0.00195*** -0.00086*** 
[β1 + β3 + β4 + β5] (0.00026)  (0.00002) 
close-call:  right incumbent, λ
med  -0.00095* -0.00043*** 
[β1 + β3] (0.00052)  (0.00003) 
left-victory:  right incumbent, λ
lo  0.00004 -0.00000 
[β1 + β3 - β4 - β5] (0.00102)  (0.00006) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
(a)  Coefficients based on results reported in Table 1.   35
 
 
TABLE 4 
 
Hypotheses Tests: Sovereign Bond Spreads Relative to Comparable U.S. Treasuries 60 and 90 Days 
Before Election, 1994–2000
a 
 
 
Pre-election Window → 
Hypothesis ↓  Hypothesis Test  60 days  90 days 
H1: Increasingly Positive Pre-election Spreads for Elections 
with Right-Wing Incumbents as Likelihood of Incumbent 
Victory Decreases (λ
hi < λ
med <λ
lo ) 
 β4 + β5 < 0           -0.00100* 
         (0.00053) 
        -0.00042*** 
        (0.00003) 
H2: No Change in Pre-election Spreads for Elections with 
Left-Wing Incumbents as Likelihood of Incumbent Victory 
Decreases (λ
lo ≅ λ
med ≅  λ
hi) 
 β4 = 0 
 
β4 = -0.00713*** 
        (0.00180) 
 
β4 = -0.00938*** 
        (0.00009) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
(a)  Coefficients based on results reported in Table 1. 
 
 
   36
 
Figure 1 
 
Argentina Presidential Election May 14, 1995: Sovereign Bond Yields and Relative Spreads
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Figure 2 
 
Poland Presidential Election October 8, 2000:  Sovereign Bond Yields and Relative Spreads
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